SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we hope
to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the more
interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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CRIMINAL LAW-DRUG-FREE SCHOOL ZONES-ANY PROPERTY
OWNED OR LEASED BY A SCHOOL OR SCHOOL BOARD AND USED
FOR SCHOOL PURPOSES
ZONE

IS SUBJECT TO DRUG-FREE

SCHOOL

LAws--State v. Ivory, 124 N.J. 582, 592 A.2d 205

(1991).
On October 27, 1988, defendant Charles Ivory rode a bicycle through Count Basie Park in Red Bank, NewJersey. 124 NJ.
582, 583-84, 592 A.2d 205, 205-06. Count Basie Park was owned
by the Red Bank Board of Education (Board), which leased the
park to the Borough of Red Bank (Borough) for various recreational uses. Id. at 584, 592 A.2d at 206. The terms of the lease
mandated that the Borough assign athletic field use to the Red
Bank school system, residents of Red Bank and the Department
of Parks and Recreation. Red Bank Catholic High School, a parochial school, used the fields for athletic events according to a
participation and contribution agreement with the Borough.
Acting pursuant to a previously obtained warrant, a police
officer stopped Ivory within 1,000 feet of the field. The officer
searched Ivory and discovered over sixteen grams of cocaine and
an undisclosed amount of marijuana. Ivory was charged with
possession of narcotics with intent to distribute while within
1,000 feet of school property.
On December 22, 1988, Ivory entered a retraxit plea of
guilty. The defendant admitted his possession of the drugs
within the park area and his intent to sell or share them later that
evening. Id. at 584-85, 592 A.2d at 206. The trial court, acting
sua sponte, postponed Ivory's sentencing until it addressed
whether the location of Ivory's arrest was "school property used
for school purposes," as required by N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:35-7
(West 1991) (school zone statute). Id. at 585, 592 A.2d at 206.
The trial court determined that the fields were school property
within the meaning of the statute based solely on the Board's
ownership of the area. Id.
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, denied Ivory's motion to supplement the record and affirmed the
verdict set forth by the trial court. Id. The New Jersey Supreme
Court granted certification and allowed Ivory to supplement the
record. Id.
Writing for the majority, Justice Garibaldi began her analysis
by considering the plain language and the legislative purpose underlying the school zone statute. Id. at 585-86, 592 A.2d at 206-
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07. The majority posited that the statute's plain language was
intended to punish persons who distributed or possessed drugs
within 1,000 feet of "school property used for school purposes."
Id. at 586, 592 A.2d at 206-07 (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:35-7
(West 1991)). Justice Garibaldi averred that the statute was intended to promote an aggressive campaign against the proliferation of drug use and drug related crime. Id., 592 A.2d at 207.
Primarily, the majority posited, the school zone statute was intended to safeguard vulnerable children from the evils of drug
abuse and drug trafficking. Id. at 586-87, 592 A.2d at 207. The
majority characterized the statute as erecting a barrier to insulate
children in and around the school area. Id.
The court articulated a two-pronged test to determine
whether the defendant violated the school zone statute by possessing narcotics within 1,000 feet of school property used for
school purposes. Id. at 587, 592 A.2d at 208. First, the majority
defined "school property" as any parcel owned or leased by a
school or school board. Id. at 588, 592 A.2d at 208. Based on the
Board's ownership of the area, the court concluded that Count
Basie Park was "school property." Id. The court added that the
Borough's presence as a "non-academic intermediary leaseholder" did not alter this determination. Id.
Second, the court addressed whether the property was used
for school purposes. Id. The court found unpersuasive Ivory's
contention that such a classification required that the fields be
used exclusively for school purposes and further reasoned that
the absence of children during the crime did not mitigate the actor's liability. Id. Justice Garibaldi astutely posited that a contrary holding would abrogate the constant zone of protection
intended by the legislature. Id. at 589, 592 A.2d at 208. Additionally, the majority discerned no unjust harm in the statute's
collateral effect of protecting anyone who might enjoy the premises. Id.
Continuing to explain the second prong, Justice Garibaldi
construed the term "school purposes" to extend beyond formal
education. Id. The justice explained that drug education was not
limited to the classroom but necessarily includes the leadership
of counselors, gym teachers and coaches. Id. The majority further reasoned that children regularly congregated at playgrounds
when school was not in session, thus requiring that the safety
zone remain in effect when classes were over. Id. The justice emphasized that this battle could be waged only by educating the
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student at all levels and in an environment completely devoid of
drugs. Id. at 589-90, 592 A.2d at 208-09.
The majority concluded that sufficient evidence existed to
demonstrate that Red Bank Catholic High School used the property for school purposes. Id. at 590, 592 A.2d at 209. The court
noted that the high school, in accordance with the terms of the
agreement, used the athletic fields for a variety of sporting
events. Id. The schedules for these events, Justice Garibaldi continued, were regularly sent to the citizens of Red Bank. Id. Additionally, the fields were often emblazoned with the high school's
insignia and the teams wore uniforms indicating their respective
schools. Id. at 590-91, 592 A.2d at 209. The court concluded
that these practices, when combined with the participation agreement, were sufficient to place reasonable persons on notice that
the park fell within the statutory prohibition. Id. at 591, 592 A.2d
at 209.
Justice Garibaldi conceded that the legislature made little effort to be fair to drug dealers. Id. The majority did not view the
statute, however, as unjust or violative of Ivory's constitutional
rights. Id. A conviction could be obtained under the statute, the
majority maintained, only where both prongs of the test were
met. Id. The majority explained that the "school property"
prong could be established by the ownership or leasing of the
area by a primary or secondary education establishment. Id.
The court submitted, however, that a myriad of factors could satisfy the "school purposes" tier, including any signs, newspaper
accounts, published athletic schedules or other indicia that would
place an objectively reasonable person on notice of a school's
regular and consistent use of the fields. Id. at 591-92, 592 A.2d at
209-10. The majority averred that a defendant prosecuted under
such circumstances did not suffer a due process violation by not
having fair notice of the property's nature. Id. at 592, 592 A.2d at
210.
The court also dismissed Ivory's contention that the school
zone statute required affirmative proof of an intent to distribute
narcotics within the prohibited area. Id. Finding this notion inconsistent with both the plain language and legislative intent of
the strict liability statute, the court observed that the school zone
law proscribed any possession or distribution of drugs within
1,000 feet of school property used for school purposes. Id. Persuaded by several recent appellate court decisions, the court further observed that an individual arrested under the school zone
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statute may utilize one affirmative defense. Id. at 594, 592 A.2d
at 211. The majority explained that the defendant would have to
prove that his or her narcotics possession did not involve distribution for profit and that the possession occurred in a private
residence in which no juvenile was present. Id. The majority,
therefore, concluded that culpability resulted simply from being
located within 1,000 feet of a school area, regardless of intent.
Id. at 594, 592 A.2d at 211. (citing State v. Ogar, 229 N.J. Super.
459, 467, 551 A.2d 1037, 1041 (App. Div. 1989)).
Justice Clifford authored a concise concurring opinion reflecting the justice's difficulty in accepting the majority's finding
that the defendant had fair notice. Id. at 595-96, 592 A.2d at 212
(Clifford, J., concurring).
In a pointed dissent, Justice Stein criticized the statute as unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 598, 592 A.2d at 213 (Stein, J., dissenting). The justice charged that the state failed to provide the
public with constitutionally-adequate notice that Count Basie
Park was a drug-free school zone. Id. As a result, the dissent
contended that individuals could not reasonably know what conduct was prohibited, so as to comport themselves accordingly.
Id. at 599, 592 A.2d at 213 (Stein, J., dissenting) (citing Connally
v. General Constr. Co., 296 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
Justice Stein disputed the majority's assertion that school
use of the property was reasonably ascertainable. Id. The dissenter noted that no such evidence was provided in the record
and that the actual school use fell short of the fair notice standard. Id. at 600, 592 A.2d at 214 (Stein, J., dissenting). The justice also distinguished Ivory's case from other instances wherein
courts did not require proof that the defendants knew that the
proscribed conduct occurred within 1,000 feet of school property. Id. In these cases, Justice Stein contended, the area was
clearly demarcated as school property, thus obviating a due process issue. Id. In the instant case, however, Justice Stein found
no evidence that Count Basie Park was similarly marked as a
drug-free school zone. Id.
The majority's willingness to find that Ivory had fair notice
that Count Basie Park was included under the imperative of the
school zone statute is disquieting. The only evidence of park use
by the school was the participation and contribution agreement.
Although the majority referred to published schedules, team
uniforms and field preparation, no such indicia of school use was
actually part of the record. Additionally, such indicia, even if part
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of the record, may still fail the fair notice standard. For example,
an individual visiting Red Bank from another county or state
might be completely unaware of the high school's use of the
fields.
In this regard, the majority's criteria for finding the school
use prong of the test satisfied is amorphous and arbitrary. "Reasonably ascertainable," as interpreted and applied by the Ivory
court, can fairly apply only to residents of Red Bank who follow
the high school's athletic teams. The fair notice issue could be
easily solved, however, by the erection of appropriate signs indicating protected school zones, a practice that the majority noted
has been undertaken by many counties.
Conversely, the court's holding is laudable for several reasons. Primarily, the Ivory decision reflects undaunted judicial
support for the legislature's vigorous but formidable battle
against the proliferation of drug use and its attendant harms.
Further, by couching its interpretation of the school zone statute
in terms of an impermeable safety zone protecting school children, the court commendably joined the legislature in a consolidated fight against drug abuse. Both the legislature and court
recognize that halting drug abuse cannot be achieved by waging
the war at only one level.
Arresting narcotics dealers and manufacturers strikes a blow
with an ephemeral effect because the allure of a quick and substantial financial reward provides sufficient incentive for others to
replace the incarcerated pusher. However, educating youth
about the dangers of drugs, while shielding them from exposure
to narcotics, does much more to ensure that future generations
will learn to "just say no."
Michael Hammer
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POSSESSION-MUNICIPALLY-OWNED

SUBJECT To ADVERSE POSSESSION

LAND

WHERE THE LAND

NOT UTILIZED FOR A PUBLIC PURPOSE-Devins v. Borough

IS

of

Bogota, 124 N.J. 570, 592 A.2d 199 (1991).
In an in rem foreclosure in 1962, the Borough of Bogota
(Borough) acquired title to a vacant lot on Fairview Avenue identified as Lot 10 (Lot). 124 N.J. at 572, 592 A.2d at 200 (1991).
Following the acquisition, the Borough failed to use, improve or
put the Lot to public use. Three years later, plaintiffs James and
Mary Devins purchased the adjacent lot, Lot 11, which contained
a single-family home. The sellers, James and Jeanette Geraghty,
also conveyed Lot 10 to the plaintiffs by quitclaim deed. The
Geraghtys had themselves received a quitclaim deed to Lot 10 in
1958.
When the plaintiffs acquired the deed to Lot 10, a barbecue
pit and a chain link fence existed on the property. Since 1965,
the plaintiffs used, improved and maintained the Lot by building
a shed, erecting a basketball backboard, paving a portion for
parking, and various other means. Id. at 573, 592 A.2d at 200.
Although the plaintiffs never paid taxes on the Lot, their use of
the property went unchallenged until 1985, when their attorney
wrote to the mayor and Council of Bogota seeking recognition
that the plaintiffs held title to the property by virtue of twenty
years of adverse possession. The Borough responded that municipal land is not subject to adverse possession and denied the
plaintiffs' claim. The plaintiffs sought a judicial declaration that
they had acquired title to Lot 10 by adverse possession.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, recognized that the plaintiffs had taken sufficient action to establish
title to the property by adverse possession, but held that adverse
possession may not be asserted against a municipality and
granted summary judgment to the Borough. Id. at 573, 592 A.2d
at 200. The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the chancery court's decision. Id. The New Jersey
Supreme Court granted certification and held that municipally
owned property neither dedicated to public use nor used for a
public purpose is subject to adverse possession laws. Id. at 572,
592 A.2d at 200.
Justice Pollock, writing for a unanimous court, began his
analysis by defining adverse possession as "a method of acquiring title by possessing property in a specified manner for a statu-
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tory period," the expiration of which results in a transfer of title
from the owner to the possessor, barring the owner's right to
eject the possessor. Id. at 574, 592 A.2d at 201. Justice Pollock
noted that the expiration of a specified statute of limitations
forms the basis for acquiring title by adverse possession. Id. (citing O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 494, 416 A.2d 862, 870 (1980)).
The statutory period varies, Justice Pollock observed, depending
on the nature of the property, the time of possession and
whether the adverse possessor is claiming the land under color of
title. Id. Thus, the majority found that under New Jersey law the
statutory period may run from twenty to sixty years. Id. Justice
Pollock pointed out that the plaintiffs did not specify which limitations period was applicable, but rather asserted that they had
acquired title to Lot 10 by adversely possessing it for over twenty
years. Id.
The court next considered the historical exemption of governmentally owned property from adverse possession claims and
initially recognized that no New Jersey case has permitted a claim
of adverse possession upon governmental property. Id. Justice
Pollock maintained that this rule applies, however, only where
the property has been "dedicated to public use." Id. at 575, 592
A.2d at 201 (quoting Patton v. NorthJersey District Water Supply Commission, 93 N.J. 180, 190, 459 A.2d 1177, 1182 (1983)). Therefore, the court determined that the issue regarding municipal
land not dedicated to public use was a question of first impression. Id.
Justice Pollock recognized that the rationale for the exemption of government property from adverse possession claims was
rooted in the ancient doctrine of nullum tempus, which means
"time does not ruh- against the king." Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY

963 (5th ed. 1969)). According to Justice Pollock,

the nullum tempus exception was theorized upon the notion that
the king was too busy to keep track of his property. Id. at 576,
592 A.2d at 202 (citing Cornelius & Empson v. Giberson, 25 N.J.L. 1,
28 (1855)). Thejustice explained that the nullum tempus doctrine
primarily was applied by New Jersey courts to claims of adverse
possession on public lands. Id. Accordingly, Justice Pollock
found that despite the absence of statutory protection, the New
Jersey courts traditionally held that adverse possession could not
be asserted against property owned by the state or by a municipality. Id. (citations omitted).
The court emphasized that all decisions applying the nullum
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tempus doctrine involved land that was "dedicated to or used for a
public purpose." Id. at 575, 592 A.2d at 202. Considering the
policy reasons for exempting publicly used land from claims of
adverse possession, the court concluded that the nullum tempus
doctrine should not be applied to state or muncipally-owned
property not used for a public purpose. Id. at 575-76, 592 A.2d at
202. Rather, Justice Pollock determined that the justifications
supporting adverse possession were applicable to such property
and encouraged efficient land use. Id. at 577, 592 A.2d at 202.
The court also acknowledged that the current trend in tort
and contract law evidenced a growing inclination to cease treating the government differently than a private party by negating
the sovereign immunity defense. Id. Additionally, Justice Pollock
noted that several states permitted adverse possession claims
against the state in certain possession actions and that a congressional commission had called for abolishment of the municipal
land exception, reasoning that "the federal government has adequate resources to protect public land." Id. at 577-78, 592 A.2d
at 203. Moreover, Justice Pollock cited decisions which held that
municipally-owned land not used by the public could be acquired
by adverse possession. Id. at 579, 592 A.2d at 203 (citing
Goldman v. Quadrato, 142 Conn. 398, 114 A.2d 687 (1955); Siejack
v. City of Baltimore, 270 Md. 640, 313 A.2d 843 (1974)).
The court concluded, therefore, that municipally-owned
property not dedicated to or used for a public purpose should be
treated as privately owned. Id. Justice Pollock determined that
such a rule would encourage municipalities to efficiently use
property and return it to the tax roll. Id. at 578-79, 592 A.2d at
203. Thus, the justice posited that subjecting a municipality to
adverse possession claims did not place an undue burden upon
the municipality to keep accurate records of land ownership and
use. Id. at 578, 592 A.2d at 203.
Justice Pollock ascertained that the lower courts had not considered the nature of the plaintiffs adverse possession. Id. at 580,
592 A.2d at 204. Noting that the plaintiffs never formally notified the Borough of the claim to the Lot, the court determined
that they complied not "with the letter [but] the spirit of the adverse possession statutes." Id. The court, therefore, remanded
the case to determine whether the plaintiffs openly and notoriously possessed the Lot, thereby giving the Borough unequivocal
notice of their intent. Id. Justice Pollock also instructed the lower
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court to consider whether the plaintiffs must pay back taxes on
the lot. Id.
Lastly, Justice Pollock questioned whether the new rule
should apply retroactively. Id. Because the new rule was fact specific, the justice determined that retroactive application would
create numerous complications. Id. at 581, 592 A.2d at 204.
Therefore, the court ruled that the decision could only be applied prospectively and encouraged the legislature to reconsider
the nullum tempus doctrine in light of the decision. Id.
The Devins court correctly focused on the spirit of the adverse possession laws because upholding the nullum tempus doctrine would have encouraged land waste. The Borough allowed
the Lot to remain vacant for over twenty years while the plaintiffs, who employed the land for their use and enjoyment, were
rightly rewarded for that use. The Borough, using the simplest
of tracking procedures, should have observed the plaintiffs' use
and sought ejectment. Because the Borough chose to take no
action, however, the court correctly refused to estop the plaintiffs' efficient use of the property. The new rule, however, should
be restricted to situations where public land is not put to public
use. The nullum tempus doctrine should remain intact when the
government property is utilized for the public good.
Because the exception is narrow and fact specific, there is
little justification for refusing retroactive application. The potential for confusion is slight considering the limited number of
claims that fit the narrow rule and the court could further lessen
any possible confusion by setting a time limit on retroactive
claims. Such action would be consistent with the court's holding
and encourage accurate government record keeping.
Mary B. Edwards
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT TO KNOW LAW-THE MINUTES OF EXECUTIVE SESSIONS AND MEMORANDA CONTAINING
THE TERMS OF A PUBLIC EMPLOYEE'S TERMINATION ARE SUBJECT TO DISCLOSURE FOLLOWING AN IN CAMERA REVIEW-

South Jersey Publishing Company, Inc., v. New Jersey Expressway
Authority, 124 N.J. 478, 591 A.2d 921 (1991).
On March 16, 1989, Donald B. Vass (Vass), the Executive
Director of the New Jersey Expressway Authority (Authority)
since 1985, resigned from his position. 124 N.J. at 484-85, 591
A.2d at 924. Prior to Vass's resignation, the South Jersey Publishing Company, Inc. (South Jersey) published several articles
alleging improper activities by Vass during his tenure at the
Authority.
Consequently, the Authority investigated employee use of
company credit cards. The targeted individuals were notified of
the Authority's intent to discuss the investigation in an executive
session. The employees were also informed of their right to request that the matter be discussed in a public meeting.
At the Authority's February 16 and March 16, 1989 regular
meetings, the Authority adopted resolutions empowering its
Commissioners to hold an executive session concerning the Vass
situation. Id. at 484-85, 591 A.2d at 924. Both resolutions provided that the executive session minutes would be disclosed upon
final resolution unless the Commissioner decided such disclosure
would defeat the purpose of a confidential meeting.
At an early March closed session meeting, a draft of the
Memorandum of Understanding (Memorandum), containing the
terms of Vass's resignation, was reviewed. The Memorandum
called for the continuation of Vass's salary and benefits through
December 31, 1989. Id., 591 A.2d at 925. At an open session,
the Authority adopted a resolution accepting the terms of the
Memorandum. Id. at 486, 591 A.2d at 925. In addition, the Authority and Vass agreed that the Memorandum would remain
part of Vass's personnel file and not be publicly disclosed. Id. at
485, 591 A.2d at 925.
Following its investigation, the Authority made a public
statement that it would be inappropriate for Vass to continue his
employment at the Authority. The Authority also disclosed that
the Attorney General's review revealed no criminal liability on
behalf of Vass. Shortly thereafter, South Jersey requested a copy
of the executive session minutes and the Memorandum. Id. at
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486, 591 A.2d at 925. The Authority responded that the documents were permanently confidential. In April 1989, South
Jersey instituted a lawsuit against the Authority seeking disclosure of the documents.
The trial court granted the Authority's motion for summary
judgment, interpreting the personnel provision of the Open Public Meetings Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-12(b)(8) (West 1976), as
an implicit exception to the disclosure requirement of the Right
to Know Law. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:IA-2 (West 1989)).
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division affirmed. Id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification, reversed and remanded the case to the law division. Id. at 498, 591
A.2d at 932. Finding no conflict between disclosure of the minutes and the purpose of the executive session, the court held that
the Open Public Meetings Act required disclosure. Id. The majority also determined that the Memorandum qualified as a "public record" under common law, and remanded the case to
determine whether disclosure of the Memorandum was warranted. Id.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Stein began his analysis by tracing New Jersey's common law and legislative commitment to maintaining an informed public. Id. at 486-87, 591 A.2d
at 925. The court echoed the three common law requirements
necessary to obtain access to information kept by a public body.
Id. at 487-88, 591 A.2d at 925-26. First, the court stated that the
party seeking disclosure must establish an interest in the material
sought. Id. at 487, 591 A.2d at 925 (citing Irval Realty, Inc. v.
Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 61 N.J. 366, 372, 294 A.2d
425, 428 (1972)). For example, posited the court, a newspaper's
interest in informing the public is sufficient under common law.
Id., 591 A.2d at 926 (citing Red Bank Register v. Board of Education
of Long Branch, 206 N.J. Super. 1, 9, 501 A.2d 985, 989 (App. Div.
1985)).
Second, the court pointed out that once an interest is established, the information sought must qualify as a "public record."
Id. The justice explained that the information must be a "written
memorial made by a public officer authorized to perform that
function . . . ." Id. (quoting Nero v. Hyland, 76 N.J. 213, 222, 386
A.2d 846, 851 (1978)).
Justice Stein characterized the third step as a balance between the individual's need for the information and the public
interest in maintaining confidentiality. Id. at 488, 591 A.2d at
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926. Justice Stein noted that an in camera inspection of the material may be necessary to properly ascertain disclosable material.
Id.
Having outlined the common law disclosure provisions, the
supreme court next addressed the parameters of the Right to
Know Law. Id. at 489, 591 A.2d at 927 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 47:1A-1 (West 1989)). The court pointed out that even though
a "public record" is defined more narrowly under the Right to
Know Law than under the common law, a citizen can readily obtain public records without first having established an interest.
Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-2 (West 1989)).
Justice Stein next focused on the 1975 amendment of the
Open Public Meetings Act. Id. at 490, 591 A.2d at 927. Thejustice explained the amended Act required that the minutes of all
meetings (private and open) be made available to the public. Id.
at 491, 591 A.2d at 928 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-14 (West
1976)). The court emphasized that this open-door policy enhanced the operation of the democratic process. Id. (quoting
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-7 (West Supp. 1991)). Nevertheless,
noted the court, the Act did allow specifically identified subject
areas to be confidentially discussed at executive sessions. Id. at
490, 591 A.2d at 927 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-12(b) (West
1976)). The court observed that any matter related to the employment, termination or performance of a public officer or employee of a public body was a suitable executive session matter.
Id. at 490-91, 591 A.2d at 927-28 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:412(b)(8) (West 1976)).
Attending to the immediate dispute, Justice Stein first addressed the propriety of the Press's request for the executive session minutes. Id. The court recognized the Authority's interest
in encouraging honest communication as the basis for holding a
private meeting on the matter. Id. at 492, 591 A.2d at 928-29.
Nevertheless, Justice Stein quickly pointed out that the Open
Public Meetings Act required the minutes of all meetings to be
made available to the public if the disclosure did not interfere
with the closed meeting's purpose. Id. at 493, 591 A.2d at 929
(citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-14 (West 1976)).
Justice Stein found no inconsistency between requiring disclosure of the executive session minutes and the Authority's purpose in holding a closed session. Id. at 493, 591 A.2d at 929.
Rather, the court recommended modifying the minutes to protect the authority's confidentiality concerns. Id. at 494, 591 A.2d
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at 929. In making its determination, the court relied heavily on
th6 policy reasons underlying the Open Public Meetings Act and
the misuse of public funds. Id. at 494-95, 591 A.2d at 929-30.
Next, the court determined that the minutes qualified as a
"public record" within the meaning of the Right to Know Law.
Id. at 495, 591 A.2d at 930. Strictly construing the Act's personnel exception, the court permitted disclosure of the minutes. Id.
at 495, 591 A.2d at 930 (citing NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-12(b)(8)
(West 1976)). The court buttressed its holding by recognizing
that disclosure was warranted under executive order. Id. at 496,
591 A.2d at 930. Justice Stein began his discussion of the Memorandum by noting that the Open Public Meetings Act did not
specifically provide for the disclosure of such documents. Id.
Furthermore, explained the court, the Open Public Meetings Act
did not require the keeping of such memoranda. Id. Therefore,
the court concluded that the Memorandum did not qualify as a
"public record" and was not subject to disclosure under New
Jersey statutory law. Id.
Under the common law, however, Justice Stein determined
that the criteria for disclosure had been met. Id. at 496, 591 A.2d
at 931. First, the court stated that South Jersey held a sufficient
interest in keeping the public informed. Id. Viewing the press as
the mediator between the public and governmental bodies, the
court stressed that disclosure facilitated accurate reporting of
public body actions. Id. at 496-97, 591 A.2d at 931. Second, Justice Stein asserted that the Memorandum qualified as a "public
record" under the common law as a written memorial of an authorized public official. Id. at 497, 591 A.2d at 931 (citing Nero,
76 N.J. at 222, 386 A.2d at 851). As a result, the supreme court
remanded the issue to determine whether disclosure of the Memorandum was warranted. Id. at 498, 591 A.2d at 931. Justice
Stein instructed the lower court to balance the respondents' privacy concerns against the public interest in disclosure. Id. Justice Stein also ordered, in the event disclosure was warranted,
that an in camera review be conducted to delete any privileged
matter. Id. at 498, 591 A.2d at 932.
In reaching its decision, the court focused on two competing
interests: the privacy rights of the individual and the public's
right to know. While the press should enjoy great latitude in
publishing information pertaining to public officials and public
figures, the Authority has a legitimate concern in keeping executive session documents confidential and ensuring open and hon-
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est debate. The New Jersey Supreme Court struck a just
compromise between these competing concerns by ordering an
in camera review of the documents to delete any privileged or
personal matters. Lower courts must fully recognize the competing interests and conduct in camera reviews meticulously and
conscientiously.
A democratic society is based on an informed citizenry.
Honest, open disclosure of governmental proceedings breeds
trust and confidence, while secrecy fosters suspicion and distrust.
Clearly, it is in society's best interest to have a well-informed
public. Justice Stein's equitable balance ensures that interest
without intruding into the arena of personal matters.
Elisabeth L'Heureux

CONSTITUTIONAL
INAL

DEFENDANT

LAW-RIGHT TO A NON-JURY TRIAL-CRIM-

HAS No

UNILATERAL RIGHT TO A BENCH

TRIAL AND THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY USED ITS DISCRETION
TO DETERMINE THAT THE FACTS WERE TO BE WEIGHED BY A

JURY-State v. Dunne, 124 N.J. 303, 590 A.2d 1144 (1991).
The defendant, Robert Dunne (Dunne), was driving through
South Mountain Reservation on the morning of May 11, 1986,
when he attempted to act out a homosexual fantasy by murdering
a man and sodomizing his corpse. Id. at 320, 590 A.2d at 1152
(Handler, J., dissenting). The victim managed to survive a stab
wound long enough to scratch out the fleeing murderer's license
plate number. Id. at 306-07, 590 A.2d at 1145. Despite extensive
surgery, the victim died later that day. Id. at 307, 590 A.2d at
1145. Police traced the plate number to Dunne and arrested him
at his residence. The defendant confessed to the stabbing.
At trial, Dunne planned to raise an insanity defense. Id. at
307, 590 A.2d at 1146. Fearing that ajury would react adversely,
the defendant moved for a bench trial. Id. The trial court rejected the motion. Id. During the subsequent trial, a physician
testified in support of Dunne's insanity defense. Id. at 307-08,
590 A.2d at 1146. The doctor explained that the defendant was a
paranoid schizophrenic who did not know that his actions were
wrong. Id.
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The jury convicted Dunne and he was sentenced to thirty
years in prison. Id. at 308, 590 A.2d at 1146. The New Jersey
Superior Court, Appellate Division upheld the conviction, and
the New Jersey Supreme Court certified the defendant's petition.
Id.
The supreme court held that bizarre circumstances do not
create a unilateral right to a bench trial and that the trial judge
did not abuse his discretion in concluding that the issues were to
be considered by a jury. Id. at 306, 590 A.2d at 1145. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction. Id. at 320, 590 A.2d at
1152.
Justice O'Hern, writing for the majority, noted that the defendant raised a two-part argument on appeal. Id. at 308, 590
A.2d at 1146. The defendant argued he was entitled as a matter
of right to a non-jury trial or, alternatively, that the trial judge
abused his discretion in failing to grant a bench trial. Id. Reviewing the defendant's reasons for a bench trial, the justice described Dunne's fear that a jury would be prejudiced by the
expected psychiatric testimony. Id. The justice also explained
Dunne's belief that the medical evidence, pointing to Dunne's violent and abnormal homosexual fantasies, would bias the jury's
evaluation of the insanity defense testimony. Id. The majority
reiterated the trial judge's findings, however, that a compelling
reason was lacking for a waiver and that the community should
decide this type of case. Id. at 309, 590 A.2d at 1146. Justice
O'Hern additionally stated that the trial judge placed his faith in
the jury voir dire to eliminate any potential prejudice. Id.
After analyzing the defendant's arguments, the majority focused upon his unilateral right to a bench trial claim. Id. Relying
on Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930), the majority concluded that the United States Supreme Court read the constitution to preserve the jury trial right to protect the accused but not
to establish it as "integral and inseparable" from the criminal
trial. 124 N.J. at 309-10, 590 A.2d at 1146-47 (quoting Patton,
281 U.S. at 297). Thus, the court repeated, the Constitution conferred a right which could be waived, otherwise a privilege would
be changed into a preemptory requirement. Id. at 310, 590 A.2d
at 1147 (citing Patton, 281 U.S. at 298).
The majority opinion emphasized Patton's concern that the
jury trial remain the preferred method of resolving criminal
cases. Id. (citing Patton, 298 U.S. at 312-13). The principles to be
followed, as repeated by the majority, were that the defendant
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knowingly consented to the waiver, the prosecution and the court
sanctioned the waiver, and the trial court increased its caution as
the crime's degree increased. Id. The justice indicated that the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were consistent with these
principles. Id. at 310-11, 590 A.2d at 1147 (citing FED. R. CRIM.
PRO. 23(a)).
The majority stressed that the constitutionality of Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 23(a) had been upheld, and
that there was no constitutional right to waive a jury trial. Id. at
311, 590 A.2d at 1147 (citing Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24
(1965)). The only constitutional right, Justice O'Hern noted, was
the right to an impartial trial by jury. Id.
Justice O'Hern posited that those provisions of the New
Jersey Constitution which guarantee trial by jury should be interpreted no differently than their federal counterparts. Id. at 31112, 590 A.2d at 1148 (citing N.J. Const. of 1947, art. I, §§ 9, 10).
Accordingly, the court held that under both the United States
and New Jersey Constitutions, Dunne had no right to demand a
bench trial. Id. at 312, 590 A.2d at 1148.
The supreme court then addressed Dunne's second argument that the trial court overstepped its discretionary boundary
in denying Dunne's bench trial request. Id. The majority stated
that the New Jersey rule providing for non-jury trials in criminal
cases required consent of the courts and government when a capital offense was involved. Id. at 312-13, 590 A.2d at 1148 (citing
N.J. CT. R. 1:8-1(a) (1991)). The court noted that one New
Jersey appellate court interpreted the deletion of government
consent as establishing a constitutional preference for a bench
trial. Id. at 313, 590 A.2d at 1149 (citing State v. Fiorilla,226 N.J.
Super. 81, 543 A.2d 958 (App. Div. 1988)). The majority noted
that the Fiorillacourt, in reversing a waiver denial, considered the
trial court's sole reliance upon public perception and the exclusion of the defendant's good-faith arguments to be erroneous.
Id. (citations omitted). The Fiorilla court, Justice O'Hern determined, did not find a constitutional right to a bench trial but held
that there must be sufficient reasons for denying a waiver. Id.
(citations omitted).
The justice noted that Fiorilla created a three-part test which
required denial of a waiver if: (1) the defendant did not knowingly, competently or voluntarily waive a jury trial; or (2) it was
not a good faith waiver but an attempt to obtain a normally unallowable procedural advantage; or (3) substantial, overriding and
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express reasons existed which demanded a jury trial despite the
reasons supporting a waiver. Id. at 314, 590 A.2d at 1149 (citing
Fiorilla, 226 N.J. Super. at 92, 543 A.2d at 958). The majority,
however, rejected the Fiorilla court's suggestion of a "correlative
superior right" to a bench trial. Id. at 314, 590 A.2d at 1149.
While agreeing with the premise of vesting discretion in the trial
judge, the majority stated that neither the court rules nor the
Constitution favored a non-jury trial. Id. (citations omitted).
Rather, the majority emphasized that as the seriousness of the
criminal offense increases, the burden upon the accused to show
why there should be a bench trial also escalates. Id. at 314-15,
590 A.2d at 1149 (citations omitted).
The supreme court modified the third prong of Fiorilla by
advancing the role of public confidence in the jury system. Id. at
315, 590 A.2d at 1149. The majority reasoned that the trial court
must preserve public confidence in criminal trials and that this
policy is best supported by ajury finding. Id., 590 A.2d at 114950 (citations omitted). Justice O'Hern, however, noted that a
trial judge must insure that the waiver denial does not diminish
the accused's right to a fair trial. Id. at 316, 590 A.2d at 1150.
Unfairness is best determined after the jury voir dire, the court
concluded. Id. The court summarized its modification of the
Fiorillatest by instructing trial courts to state the reasons for their
determinations and to consider all relevant factors. Id. at 317,
590 A.2d at 1150-51.
Acknowledging that there was no conclusive list of factors to
assist the trial courts, Justice O'Hern proposed an evidential
scale. Id., 590 A.2d at 1151. The justice indicated that the increasing gravity of the crime should weigh in favor of a jury trial.
Id. The majority also emphasized that the state's position, the
complexity and length of evidence presentations, the jury's suitability for resolving the issues, the level of emotion surrounding
the case, the presence of highly-technical issues and the possibility of numerous rulings on evidence admissibility should also be
weighed as factors. Id. Justice O'Hern confidently concluded that
the scale would aid both a trial court's discretionary judgment
and an appellate court's review. Id. at 317-18, 590 A.2d at 1151
(citations omitted).
Justice O'Hern rebutted the dissenting argument that the
majority's decision placed "unfettered and unguided" discretion
in the trial courts. Id. at 318, 590 A.2d at 1151. The justice
pointed out that, while the dissent claimed the accused should
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almost always be permitted to waive a jury trial, both the majority
and dissenting opinions vested discretion in the trial judge, and
nothing in the dissent's formula would lead to approval of jury
waiver in most instances. Id. The court reemphasized its claim
that public confidence in jury trials supported trial by jury in
most criminal cases. Id. at 318-19, 590 A.2d at 1151. The court
conclusively affirmed the appellate division on all remaining issues. Id. at 319-20, 590 A.2d at 1152.
Justice Handler, in a vigorous dissent, agreed with the majority that there was no constitutional right to a non-jury trial. Id.
at 326, 590 A.2d at 1155 (Handler, J., dissenting). The justice,
however, concluded that a defendant has a protectable interest in
a jury trial waiver. Id.
Justice Handler criticized the majority for increasing the difficulty of obtaining a waiver. Id. at 321, 590 A.2d at 1152-53
(Handler, J., dissenting). The justice considered Justice
O'Hern's scale to provide little guidance for deciding the waiver
issue. Id. at 321-22, 590 A.2d at 1153 (Handler, J., dissenting).
In addition, the dissenting opinion noted that prior appellate decisions indicated that a jury may be waived in complex cases, but
not in cases involving emotional issues such as racism. Id. at 322,
590 A.2d at 1153 (Handler, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
The justice surmised that the majority seemed to endorse the
lower courts' rationale but created an even less precise standard.
Id. The court's reworking of the third prong of the Fiorilla test,
according to Justice Handler, placed an onerous burden upon a
defendant attempting to secure a waiver, because the trial judge
need not find substantial reasons for denying the defendant's
motion. Id. at 323, 590 A.2d at 1153 (Handler, J., dissenting).
Focusing on case law, the dissent argued that the court misapplied federal- law. Id. at 323, 590 A.2d at 1154 (Handler, J.,
dissenting). The dissent pointed out that the majority did not
adhere to the holding of Patton, which suggests that because the
right to a jury trial is for the accused's protection, a defendant
may elect to forego this right, and that a jury is not an "integral
and inseparable part" of a trial. Id. (quoting Patton, 281 U.S. at
297-98). While conceding the lack of a constitutional right to
waiver, Justice Handler next argued that a defendant has some
protectable interest in ajury trial waiver. Id. at 326, 590 A.2d at
1155 (Handler, J., dissenting). Thejustice inferred that the right
to a jury trial is specifically granted to the accused and that due
process concepts reflected in New Jersey criminal procedure re-
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quire the committing judge to inform the accused of the right to
waive a jury trial. Id. (citing N.J. CT. R. 3:4-2 (1991)).
The dissenting opinion also noted that several states agree
that a jury waiver interest is protectable. Id. at 327, 590 A.2d at
1155-56 (Handler, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Furthermore, the justice discerned that the amendment of R. 1:8-1, eliminating government consent, manifests an intent to bolster the
accused's right to waive a jury trial. Id. at 330, 590 A.2d at 1157
(Handler, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The dissent summarized that as a protected interest, the burden should be on those
seeking to deny the waiver of a jury trial. Id. at 329, 590 A.2d at
1157 (Handler, J., dissenting).
An acceptable denial of waiver, the dissent reasoned, occurs
where a judge is concerned about bias or any appearance of unfairness. Id. at 331, 590 A.2d at 1157-58 (Handler, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted). Justice Handler, however, rejected the philosophies of "[c]ommunity or public 'expectations' " or that the
jury is the "most trusted method of determining guilt," as justifying waiver. Id. at 331-32, 590 A.2d at 1158 (Handler, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). According to the dissent, the accused's
ability to plead guilty and avoid ajury trial, as well as public concerns contrary to the accused's procedural rights, mock these beliefs. Id. at 332-33, 590 A.2d at 1158-59 (Handler, J., dissenting).
The justice criticized the majority's reliance upon public
confidence to support its holding. Id. at 333, 590 A.2d at 1159
(Handler, J., dissenting). The complexity of the case at hand, the
dissent argued, was ignored by the majority in favor of a weak
assumption that a jury of Dunne's peers would resolve the issues
better than a judge. Id. at 333-34, 590 A.2d at 1159 (Handler, J.,
dissenting). Justice Handler emphasized that because the case
involved an insanity defense, a compelling reason existed to
waive the jury trial. Id. at 334-35, 590 A.2d at 1159-60 (Handler,
J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
The justice stated that reliance upon public opinion cannot
be reconciled with due process and inherent fairness. Id. at 333,
590 A.2d at 1158-59 (Handler, J., dissenting). A trial judge, the
dissent concluded, can render a decision that will be as understandable to the public as a jury decision. Id. at 336, 590 A.2d at
1160 (Handler, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Finally, the dissent surmised that a jury verdict has no
greater intrinsic value than a bench verdict. Id. at 336-37, 590
A.2d at 1160-61 (Handler, J., dissenting). Justice Handler pos-
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ited that a judge's decision-making competency is fully recognized. Id. at 337, 590 A.2d at 1161 (Handler, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted). In support of the conclusion that Dunne
should have been able to waive a jury trial, Justice Handler also
suggested modifying the third factor of the Fionila test. Id. The
dissent would allow denial of a waiver only if there were express
reasons supporting jury suitability which bear more weight than
the accused's reasons in support of waiver. Id. at 338, 590 A.2d
at 1161 (Handler, J., dissenting).
The New Jersey Supreme Court has moved to restrict a criminal defendant's right to a bench trial. The court seeks to protect
the jury trial right by preventing a wholesale movement away
from jury trials in emotionally charged or complicated cases. This
is a bold maneuver considering the inherent distrust ofjuries that
has always been part of the common law judicial process. The
court correctly keeps these pervasive and important social issues-racism, sexuality, mental illness-squarely before a jury.
The actions of a psychotic defendant suffering from
necrophilic urges impact society, and society should rightly be
the party to decide the accused's fate. Certainly, the concepts
may be abhorrent to some prospective jurors. It would be more
abhorrent, however, to weaken the judicial process because of
unsubstantiated fears that all prospective jurors will be unable to
see past a defendant's psychotic make-up or his or her sexual
preferences. Justice Handler rejects this idea by claiming that
faith in the jury system is an "untested assumption." It is unfortunate that the words of a supreme court justice refer to a cornerstone of our judicial system as "untested." Such words seem to
indicate little faith in our jury system. Justice O'Hern correctly
points out that the jury voir dire does much to alleviate these
fears of prejudice.
The court seeks to uphold public faith in the judicial process
by having a defendant's peers decide if his or her behavior merits
punishment. Such reasoning requires that distasteful cases (if
there are any tasteful ones) be decided as most cases are to be
decided in our system-by a jury. That is not to say that bench
trials are to be avoided completely. The circumstances of a
bench trial should be limited, however, to clear situations of unfairness to the defendant. Happily missing in the majority's opinion are references that a judge may be better suited to resolve
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cases. Trust in the common man to perform his civic duty-and
to perform it well-enhances the respect of our judicial system.
James N. Lawlor

CRIMINAL LAW-RAPE-A PERSON IS CONSIDERED MENTALLY
DEFECTIVE WHEN UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND

THE SEXUAL NA-

TURE OF SPECIFIC BEHAVIOR OR INCAPABLE OF EXERCISING OR
COMPREHENDING THE RIGHT TO REFUSE SEXUAL CONTACT-

State v. Olivio, 123 N.J. 550, 589 A.2d 597 (1991).
On February 12, 1985, defendant Freddie Olivio and his victim, M.R., engaged in sexual intercourse. 123 N.J. 550, 553, 589
A.2d 597, 599. M.R. asserted that defendant Olivio took her to a
hotel where he threateningly forced her to engage in repeated
sexual performances. Id. at 553, 589 A.2d at 599. Olivio maintained that M.R. voluntarily engaged in sexual intercourse. Id. at
554, 589 A.2d at 599.
Olivio was arrested and charged with kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault with physical force and sexual
assault on a mentally defective person. Id. at 553, 589 A.2d at
598. In preparation for trial, M.R.'s Intelligence quotient (I.Q)
was determined to be 65, 40-50 and 86 according to various intelligence tests. Id. at 554-55, 589 A.2d at 599-600. An I.Q.
under 69 is considered "mentally defective." Id. at 554, 589
A.2d at 599. Implying that M.R. wilfully participated in the sexual endeavor, the jury acquitted the defendant on three of the
four charges. Id. at 553-54, 589 A.2d at 598-99. Olivio was convicted of sexual assault on a mentally defective person and sentenced to a five-year prison term. Id. at 553, 589 A.2d at 598-99.
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, reversed the ruling of the trial court, holding that insufficient evidence existed to establish that M.R. was mentally defective or
that M.R. was incapable of refusing a sexual solicitation. Id. at
553, 565, 589 A.2d at 599, 605. In addition, the appellate division found no evidence that proved the defendant knew or
should have known of M.R.'s mental defectiveness. Id. at 553,
589 A.2d at 599. Thereafter, the New Jersey Supreme Court
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granted certification, modified the appellate division's judgment
and remanded the matter for a new trial. Id.
Justice Handler, writing for a unanimous court, began the
analysis by defining the phrase "mentally defective" as contained
in the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice (Criminal Code). Id.
at 556-57, 589 A.2d at 600. The justice concluded that the underlying legislative intent was to establish an equitable application of the criminal statute, so that mildly retarded individuals
would be free to engage in consensual sexual activity. Id. at 556,
589 A.2d at 600. The court observed that the legislature clarified
the Criminal Code language and narrowed its grasp to encompass only those persons who genuinely lacked the ability to "understand" their sexual conduct. Id. at 556-57, 589 A.2d at 601.
The court noted that the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision
Commission clearly believed that the statutory term "appraise"
would be interpreted too liberally, thereby proscribing consensual sexual relations between mildly retarded individuals. Id.,
589 A.2d at 600-0 1. In response, the court explained, the legislature refined the meaning of mentally defective by incorporating
the word "understanding" in place of "appraising." Id. at 557,
589 A.2d at 601. The court recognized that the evolution of the
sexual assault statute exhibited two integrated concepts. Id. at
558, 589 A.2d at 601. The first concept concerned the ability of
the victim to consent to sexual activity while the second pertained
to the victim's aptitude to discern specific behavior as sexual in
nature. Id.
Considering the approaches employed by other jurisdictions, the court discovered a divergence of application. Id. at
559-60, 589 A.2d at 602. The court reviewed holdings of various
courts which required a determination of whether the mentally
defective victim comprehended the moral and societal implications of sexual behavior. Id. The court noted that such an expansive view has been criticized as an unworkable standard which
will result in convictions based on the jury's view of the act's morality, rather than on the specific facts of each case. Id. at 560,
589 A.2d 602-03 (quoting State v. Sullivan, 298 N.W.2d 267, 271
(Iowa 1980)). The court further criticized the expansive view as
one unintended by the legislature. Id., 589 A.2d at 603. The
court opined that the legislature clearly did not define "mentally
defective" to encompass the inability to appreciate the moral appropriateness of sexual conduct. Id. at 561, 589 A.2d at 603.
The court additionally reviewed the "nature and conse-
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quences" test utilized by several jurisdictions. Id. The court posited that the consequences test created numerous avenues for
interpretation, but was not as overly protective of mentally handicapped persons as the expansive view. Id. The court observed
that the consequences test, at a minimum, required a mentally
defective person to possess more than a basic understanding of
sexual activities, by showing a specific understanding of certain
consequences of sexual activity, such as pregnancy or sexually
transmitted diseases. Id.
Striving to protect the opportunity for mentally retarded individuals to pursue a life of peace and happiness and the fundamental privacy rights of procreation and contraception, Justice
Handler constructed a narrow, equitable interpretation of the
Criminal Code's definition of "mentally defective." Id. at 563-64,
589 A.2d at 604-05 (citing In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 248-52, 426
A.2d 467, 473-75 (1981)). Finding that not all mentally impaired
persons required the protection of the Criminal Code, the court
opined that the concept of "mentally defective" implicated consensual and cognitive aspects. Id. The consensual capacity, the
court explained, involved the awareness that a person has the
right to refuse to participate in sexual activity. Id. The court further stated that the cognitive aspect relates to the person's ability
to recognize certain behavior as sexual in nature. Id. This recognition, the court asserted, extended only to the physical and
physiological aspects of sexual activity, not to the consequences
of sexual intercourse. Id., 589 A.2d at 605.
The court analyzed the specific facts to determine whether
M.R. could be considered mentally defective under the Criminal
Code. Id. at 565, 589 A.2d at 605. The court initially considered
opinions rendered by other jurisdictions which found sufficient
evidence of mental defects where the person's cognitive capacity
was equal to or greater than M.R.'s capabilities. Id. at 565-66, 589
A.2d at 605 (citations omitted). The court also reviewed opinions which rejected mental defectiveness claims where the victim
was aware of the typical consequences of sexual intercourse. Id.
at 566, 589 A.2d 605-06 (citations omitted).
The court posited that M.R.'s mental capacity was somewhere between the handicap levels presented in the precedent
cases. Id., 589 A.2d at 606. Noting M.R.'s simplistic description
of sexual organs and definitive use of the word "rape," the court
found it reasonable that ajury could find that M.R. was unable to
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comprehend or assert her right to refuse to participate in sexual
activity. Id. at 567, 589 A.2d at 606.
The court further stressed the importance of providing an
adequate statutory interpretation to the jury. Id. The supreme
court rejected the trial court's belief that any explanation beyond
the statutory language of the definition was unnecessary. Id.
Rather, Justice Handler asserted that ajury must be given a complete opportunity to review the standard as it relates to the victim's mental state and demeanor under the conditions
surrounding the incident. Id. at 568, 589 A.2d at 606.
Finally, Justice Handler concluded that culpability can only
rest where the defendant knew or should have known M.R.'s
mental state. Id., 589 A.2d at 606-07. Recognizing the defendant's argument that knowledge of a mental problem is not
equivalent to possessing knowledge of a mental defect, the court
concluded that enough evidence was offered at trial to support
an inference that the defendant subjectively or objectively knew
of M.R.'s mental impediment. Id., 589 A.2d at 607.
The State v. Olivio decision represents a significant step in an
era overly-protective of the functioning abilities of disabled individuals. In modifying State v. Olivio, the New Jersey Supreme
Court recognized that the rights of the mentally handicapped
must be elevated above the historically repressive blanket of laws
instituted to govern the lives of the mentally impaired.
Justice Handler's extensive review of the substantial legal applications and opinions invokes a renewed sense of commitment
to improve the opportunities of the mentally challenged. By defining "mentally defective" as the lack of understanding sexual
conduct or the choice not to participate in such conduct, Justice
Handler necessarily protected the mentally challenged and established an equitable framework for future cases. Accentuating the
import of securing appropriate protection and freedom, the
court has clearly and definitively established a framework that
will lead to equitable results.
April Katz

